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Key conclusions
The Health and Social Care Act (2012) required 
the creation of Health and Wellbeing Boards 
(HWBs) to provide strategic leadership for 
health outcomes for localities across England. 
It was suggested that HWBs would enhance 
democratic accountability and provide a forum 
for key leaders to come together from across 
the health and social care systems. This 
research explores the extent to which HWBs 
have, or have not, enhanced democratic 
accountability through the use of strategic 
planning and performance information. The 
study is informed by a total of 39 interviews 
with experts and members of two HWBs and 
has resulted in the following key conclusions:
w Understanding of what is meant by 
democratic accountability was variable 
across the interviewees. Many interviewees 
felt that their key obligation was directly to 
their local public rather than being held 
accountable through the political process. 
The low level of public engagement with 
HWBs also suggests that democratic 
accountability is indirect and limited.
w Many members of the HWBs also recognised 
that they felt they had multiple accountabilities. 
There appeared to be a tension between an 
interviewee’s perceived accountability for 
local health outcomes as a member of the 
HWB and their accountability for their own 
organisation’s operations in long-established 
accountability relationships. For instance 
interviewees representing organisations 
operating within the health service have long 
been accountable to NHS England and the 
Department of Health.
w HWBs have been required to develop a Joint 
Health and Wellbeing Strategy, but doing so 
effectively has proved challenging. Our 
evidence suggests that important lessons 
have been learnt about the potential scope  
of HWBs as reflected in their strategy. Our 
interviewees point to how there has been a 
need to ‘refresh’ strategies and to reduce the 
number and scope of priorities. In particular 
emphasis has shifted to priorities where there 
is the potential for joint working from the 
different members of the HWBs.
w	We	find	that	there	is	some	level	of	agreement	
that, whilst the use of performance information 
in our two HWBs has been limited, it may 
become more important into the future. It is 
suggested that performance information 
accompanied by associated narratives could 
be used as a way to further improve the work 
plans and structure of HWB meetings.
w HWBs are strengthened by the developing 
relationships between the key leaders from 
across the health and social care systems. 
Their potential to improve health outcomes, 
however,	is	inhibited	by	a	lack	of	financial	and	
human resources and a lack of integration 
and system leadership. Policy initiatives such 
as sustainability and transformation partnerships 
(STPs) also contribute to uncertainty that can 
hinder the progress of HWBs.
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Introduction
Health inequality has long been a subject of interest to 
politicians. A key message from the Marmot Review 
(2010: p.15) was that “reducing health inequalities is a 
matter of fairness and social justice” and that reduced 
health inequalities would bring both economic and social 
benefits.	To	help	address	health	inequalities,	the	Marmot	
Review	identified	the	need	to	empower	local	communities	
and recommended local partnerships between primary 
care, local authorities, the third and private sectors and 
community groups. Partly in response to this, the UK 
government passed the Health and Social Care Act in 
2012. One of the key elements of the Act was the introduction 
of Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs) in local government 
and it was argued that this would “promote integration and 
partnership working … and improve democratic accountability” 
(Department of Health & Communities and Local Government, 
2010: p. 8). It is now an appropriate time to consider the 
extent to which HWBs have, or have not, been able to 
improve democratic accountability.
Existing research relating to accountability for public 
services has found the issue to be especially problematic 
as there are often multiple objectives that are by their 
nature ambiguous, conflicting and long-term, that are 
often associated with issues of equity and fairness 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2015; Parker and Gould, 1999; 
Sinclair, 1995). There is a need, therefore, for multiple 
accountabilities of different types for public services. It is 
also recognised that accountability arrangements for 
public services continue to shift as they are subject to 
frequent reform (Bracci et al., 2015: p. 2) and that such 
reforms have the potential to create tensions and “involve 
trade-off between different accountability types” (Byrkjeflot 
et al., 2014: p. 171). As such , democratic accountability is 
one type of accountability, but there are others such as 
legal, administrative, and managerial accountabilities that 
will form a complex web of relationships (see for example 
Bovens, 2007; Byrkjeflot et al., 2014; and Sinclair, 1995). 
This research investigates how public health and social 
care leaders construct and discharge accountability 
through their membership of and roles in HWBs. Statutory 
guidance issued by Government (Department of Health, 
2012), together with a parliamentary note (Heath, 2014), 
sets out numerous ways for accountability to be discharged, 
with the use of strategic planning (feeding into a Joint 
Health and Wellbeing Strategy) and performance 
measurement (in the form of information on local health 
outcomes) featuring prominently. A study by the King’s 
Fund pointed to ‘overwhelming support’ for HWBs, but 
simultaneously raised concerns relating to their operation 
(Humphries et al, 2012: p1). For example, their study 
suggested that determining a joint health and wellbeing 
strategy would be a ‘formidable test’ (ibid. p. 22) for 
boards. More generally, there is a concern that it is “easier 
to measure … and less costly to monitor” (Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2015: p. 4) activities and outputs, but such 
metrics have been criticised for their ability to only partially 
and imprecisely reflect outcomes (Dambrin and Robson, 
2011; Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011).
This research addresses these issues through interviews 
with	‘experts’	and	members	of	two	HWBs.	The	findings	
provide deeper insights into how these new accountability 
and partnership working arrangements have been enacted 
in	practice.	The	findings	will	further	understanding	of	the	
complexities and tensions associated with these relative 
new accountability arrangements such that any potential 
“accountability	overload	and	accountability	deficits”	
(Byrkjeflot	et	al.	2014:	p.	171)	can	be	identified.	In	addition,	
the	findings	increase	awareness	of	the	challenges	faced	in	
determining a joint health and wellbeing strategy and 
measuring progress towards improved health outcomes 
and reduced health inequalities.
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Research methodology
Our four broad research questions are:
w  How do members of HWBs view their accountability 
in a new context of integrated care?
w  What factors are important when constructing the 
strategy for the health and wellbeing of the local 
population?
w  How do the case HWBs construct and use performance 
information to assess progress against their health and 
wellbeing strategy?
w  What factors facilitate and inhibit the case HWBs in 
discharging their accountability? 
Given the exploratory nature of this research a 
qualitative case study approach was adopted. Two 
HWBs agreed to participate and we explored issues 
related to our research questions primarily through 
interviews with both ‘experts’ and members of the  
two HWBs.
At the outset of the study a review was undertaken of 
documents related to the reforms in the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012 that resulted in the creation of 
Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs). Of particular 
relevance were the Marmot Review (2010), statutory 
guidance issued by Government (Department of Health, 
2012) together with a parliamentary note (Heath, 2014), 
the work of the King’s Fund (see for instance Humphries 
et al, 2012; and Humphries and Galea, 2013) and the 
annual reports produced by the Local Government 
Association. To further inform our study a total of six 
interviews (seven interviewees) were conducted with 
interested	‘experts’	identified	through	our	reading	of	the	
above documents. This groundwork informed our 
interview guide for the members of our case HWBs.
Two HWBs agreed to participate with our research.  
In one case (Metro) the Local Authority Area is a 
Metropolitan Borough Council whilst the other (City) is  
a City Council. According to the Public Health England 
Health	Profile	Information,	the	Local	Authority	Areas	to	
which our case HWBs relate both have issues with health 
inequalities with marked differences in life expectancy 
between the most and least deprived areas. 
The Chairperson of both HWBs was from the Local 
Authority with a co-chair being a representative of the 
Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG). Both HWBs had 
also recently refreshed their Joint Health and Wellbeing 
Strategies (JHWS). There were also differences, however, 
with, for example, City having a rising child population 
whilst Metro has an ageing population. Another difference 
was noted in the size of the HWB membership with 
Metro being larger (with 19 members compared to  
16 members at City) and including, for example, 
representatives	from	the	police	and	fire	services.	
A	total	of	33	interviews	(fifteen	with	City	and	eighteen	
with Metro) were conducted with 35 interviewees. This 
represented the vast majority of HWB members and, in 
addition, includes a small number of interviews with 
individuals	who	had	roles	such	that	they	had	significant	
interaction with and knowledge of the workings of the 
HWB. The interviews were structured such that interviewees 
were	first	asked	about	their	experience	and	background,	
but then moved on to questions relating to their perceptions 
of accountability, strategy construction and performance 
information. In addition to interview data, the web pages, 
agenda, minutes, Joint Strategic Needs Assessment 
(JSNA) and JHWS of each HWB provided further valuable 
information. We believe this provides us with a rich 
source of data relating to these two cases. The interviews 
were	analysed	thematically	and	the	key	findings	are	
presented in the following section. So as to preserve 
anonymity	each	interviewee	is	identified	by	a	code	(Expert	
A-F,	City	A-O	and	Metro	A-R)	when	quoted	in	our	findings.	
Objectives 
The aim of this study is to investigate how public health and social care leaders construct and discharge 
accountability through their membership of and roles in Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs) which have 
been established ‘to improve democratic accountability’ for health outcomes
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Main findings and their implications for practice
 1. Accountability in a Context of Integrated Care 
Health and Wellbeing Boards
As noted in the Introduction, it has been suggested that 
HWBs will increase democratic accountability for health 
and wellbeing outcomes for a locality. This appears, at 
least	in	part,	to	be	in	response	to	a	perceived	insufficient	
level of “local democratic legitimacy in health” (Department 
of Health & Communities and Local Government, 2010: p. 
1). The same report argues that an enhanced role for local 
government through elected representatives would 
address this issue. To this end the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 states that a HWB is a “committee of the local 
authority” and must have at least one member that is a 
councillor of the local authority. It was envisaged that local 
authorities provide a broader perspective on health and 
wellbeing in a locality by being best placed to “promote 
integration of local services across the boundaries between 
the NHS, social care and public health” (Department of 
Health & Communities and Local Government, 2010: p. 1). 
Democratic accountability
Bovens (2007) and Bovens et al. (2008) suggest that the 
democratic perspective on accountability relates to the 
ability of citizens to hold to account and control those in 
public	office.	As	such,	they	argue	that	from	this	
perspective there is a “democratic chain of delegation” 
from, at one end the electorate, to their elected 
representatives and onto public servants. From this 
perspective, it is ultimately the local citizens who have the 
power to reward or sanction as they “indicate their (dis)
pleasure at the ballot box” (Bovens et al., 2008: p. 231). To 
do so the public should be provided with the information 
they need to make a judgement upon the effectiveness of 
the government’s conduct.
Recognition of the democratic accountability perspective 
was prevalent throughout our interviews. Members of 
both HWBs expressed that they felt accountability directly 
to the local population and this was irrespective of 
whether or not they were from the local authority. It is 
clear that in both of our cases information is provided by 
the HWB to local citizens. HWB meetings are open to the 
public and the agenda and minutes are made publically 
available through dedicated web pages. As such the HWB 
has “brought some of the Health discussions into a more 
public arena” (Metro, I). The public nature of these 
meetings, however, did raise some concerns as it was  
felt that some members “do not like to have difficult 
conversations in public” (Metro, N).
There	was	less	confidence	in	the	extent	to	which	the	
public were engaged in debate around the information 
provided by the HWBs. Public attendance at HWB 
meetings was very limited with one interviewee noting 
that “the same old couple of people always pitching up to 
the Board is not public engagement” (Metro, N). There was 
a general consensus that the vast majority of citizens 
were not engaged with these debates with some 
interviewees suggesting that most citizens would be not 
even be aware of the HWB’s existence. 
It was argued by some interviewees that this lack of direct 
public engagement may be compensated in two ways. 
First, it was noted that some HWB members regularly 
interact with the public. For instance, local councillors, 
GPs, and representative from both the voluntary sector 
and Healthwatch all interact frequently with members of 
the public and so can present their views as part of HWB 
meetings. In particular, a representative of the local 
Healthwatch organisation is a statutory member of the 
HWB and acts as a voice for users of health and social 
care services. As such, it is argued, citizens’ views are 
informing the debates held by the HWB. Second, some 
interviewees pointed out that the HWB was also accountable 
up the democratic chain of delegation by reporting to Full 
Council and through the Local Authority’s Scrutiny 
Committee. For instance, the joint chairs of City HWB 
“have gone to the OSC [Overview and Scrutiny Committee] 
to explain our strategy... And I quite enjoyed that and it 
was a really open and helpful discussion” (City, M). 
Multiple accountabilities
Accountability types, other than the democratic 
accountability discussed above, were also referred to by 
our interviewees. Most prominent was that members of 
the HWB felt accountable to each other. This was most 
clearly expressed, as “there’s an accountability to each 
other and that’s a very human thing rather than a statutory 
you must…” (City, C). As such the evidence from our 
interviews is that the members of these HWBs felt a 
The findings presented below draw upon the evidence from our interviews and are themed around our key 
areas of interest: accountability, strategy and performance. In addition, our interviews provided insights into 
factors that inhibit and facilitate the HWBs as they operate and look to discharge their accountability. 
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horizontal accountability to fellow board members. This 
‘partnership accountability’ appears to be further developed 
at Metro and there was a view that this horizontal form of 
accountability is more appropriate than a more vertical, 
upward accountability:
And for me, going back to that culture stuff is that if 
everybody gets it and everybody’s working towards the 
best, do you need the scrutiny under the light, the finger-
pointing? No you don’t. And you just don’t get well how do 
we make this better and that supportive and collaborative 
approach, that’s a much better way of working in my 
mind. However, if somebody’s falling short of what they 
need to and really aren’t engaging in that approach, then yes 
that’s your fall back plan. (Metro, G) 
There was also a sense that the members of the HWBs 
have a ‘collective accountability’ (Bovens, 2007) for the 
conduct and performance of the board. In addition to and 
alongside this collective accountability, however, it was 
apparent that the members of the HWB felt a responsibility 
for the department or group or organisation that they were 
representing. In some cases this was realised by the 
member providing their own ‘feedback’ to their 
organisations. This may be verbally at meetings or in 
some instances producing their own ‘user-friendly’ version 
of the minutes and ‘information sheets’ for sharing.
What was also very apparent was that certain statutory 
members	of	the	HWB	faced	significant	accountabilities	for	
health and wellbeing issues through relationships at their 
own organisation. For instance, the directors of adult 
social services, children services and public health are 
statutory	members	of	the	board,	but	have	significant	
responsibilities and accountabilities already associated 
with the performance of their directorates within the local 
authority. Similarly, a representative of the local clinical 
commissioning group (CCG) is a statutory member of the 
HWB, but the CCG faces an established accountability 
regime through NHS England and the Department of 
Health. Certainly for some interviewees these other 
accountability requirements were more challenging than 
those related to the HWB. 
An emphasis on information sharing
In order to consider the extent to which HWBs have been 
able to enhance democratic accountability we draw upon 
Bovens et al. (2008). They argue that three elements 
(information provision, debate, and consequences) are 
essential in assessing accountability. Our evidence 
suggests that the HWB has become a useful forum where 
information is shared between the different members of 
the board. In addition, a lot of information is provided to 
each HWB in the form of reports presented at the 
meetings from board members and other stakeholders 
with interests relating to the health and wellbeing of the 
local population. In fact, a concern was raised that too 
much information is presented to the Board with papers 
for	meetings	often	being	so	long	as	to	be	difficult	for	
members to fully consider all of them.
The HWB itself does provide a forum for discussion and 
debate of key issues. As noted above, however, it is 
challenging to get the public engaged in these discussions. 
The role of Healthwatch and other members who are 
regularly in contact with citizens may act as a conduit for 
the public’s voice to be heard. The public nature of the 
meetings may also stifle debate. There was certainly some 
concern	expressed	as	to	whether	‘difficult	conversations’	
would happen in public. On the whole, however, there was 
a sense that the information provided was often accepted 
by the HWB and there was rarely disagreement with regard 
to the importance of the issues raised. More challenging 
was for the HWB to then know what was being asked of it 
and how best to proceed. For example, whilst observing 
HWB meetings we heard the question posed to presenters 
‘and what is it you want from us?’
The extent to which the HWB faces consequences if it 
were to be perceived to be failing in its duty is yet to be 
tested in our two cases. What consequences are there for 
a HWB if health outcomes and health inequalities worsen? 
Similarly, the HWB itself appears to have very limited 
powers (or ‘teeth’) to hold others to account. It does have 
the statutory power to request that members of the board 
and the local authority supply information to it, but 
appears to have no formal power of sanction. Given this, 
we	find	that	any	increase	in	democratic	accountability	has	
been indirect and limited. 
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2. Constructing strategy
HWBs have a statutory duty to produce a Joint Strategic 
Needs Assessment (JSNA) and a Joint Health and 
Wellbeing Strategy (JHWS) for their local population.  
The purpose of the JSNA and JHWS is to inform the 
commissioning plans of the local authority, CCG and  
NHS England.
Multiple inputs and multiple players
The original strategies of our case study HWBs were 
constructed with numerous inputs from a range of players. 
Inputs included broad consultations, JSNA, Marmot 
Review (2010) and matters of concern both nationally and 
locally. The initial construction of the strategy was not 
controversial	and	seemed	not	to	involve	significant	
conflict. In both cases, the statutory members were active 
in considering inputs and deciding upon priorities. As an 
exception, members of the boards noted irregular 
attendance by the representative from NHS England at 
HWB, with some members speculating that this was 
perhaps due to time pressures and work duplication:
…it’s a crowded territory because my own organisation 
writes documents that are a five-year forward view and 
tells everyone what problems they’ve got to solve and how. 
(City, L)
The HWB at Metro has an expanded membership 
compared to City and therefore there seemed to be 
broader input into the strategic process. A key 
differentiating factor appeared to be the interpretation of 
the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and supplementary 
guidance, by the Chair and Co-Chair of the respective 
boards. While City did not invite providers as members 
“because this is a commissioning piece” (City, M), the HWB 
at Metro included representatives from the two main 
hospitals. It was reasoned that “there’s far more 
commissioners on the Health and Wellbeing board than 
there are providers. And therefore any votes, should we take 
one, would be overwhelmed” (Metro, A). 
Public Health lead
Respondents at both Metro and City acknowledged the 
critical role of the Director of Public Health in assembling 
and	finalising	the	JHSA	and	JHWS.	The members from 
Public Health at our respective cases felt that they had a 
key role in engaging members with the JSNA, identifying 
priorities, and assessing what intervention might be 
warranted to address issues.
There were two main advantages in public health leading 
on the strategic process. Firstly, the public health lead had 
credibility with the local authority members and members 
of the CCG, and therefore was well placed to facilitate 
integrated care. Secondly, the members of the HWBs 
appeared to appreciate the rigour brought to the process 
by the public health colleagues:
We felt that [strategy] should not be directed by what our 
current feeling is or public outcry, target headlines, A&E four 
hours or whatever is coming up through the media. (Metro, 
A)
The influence of the Public Health lead on strategy was 
impacted upon by the positioning of public health in the 
local authority. At Metro, for example, the importance of a 
separate public health directorate, accountable to the 
Chief	Executive	Officer	for	the	execution	of	duties	by	public	
health was commented upon. In contrast, the position of 
Director of Public Health at City has been downgraded to a 
second-tier role, affecting the role holder’s scope to 
engage in, and be aware of, debates at corporate level.
Manageable, evidence-based priorities
In both cases, it was recognised that there was a need to 
revisit the strategy, and to reduce the number of priorities 
from nine or ten to about half that number. The members 
of the HWB Boards acknowledged that the priorities were 
not	sufficiently	focused	upon	local	needs	and,	also,	not	
manageable given the existing duties of board members. 
A member of Metro explained the predicament as follows:
You can have an agenda that is so wide you can’t actually 
do any of it. Let’s just focus on a few things that we can 
change. I think the fewer and sharper [the priorities], the 
better. (Metro, O).
The process of refreshing the strategy was less inclusive 
than had been the case in formulating the initial strategies 
in that it involved minimal external consultation. The 
members of the boards reasoned that it was too soon 
after the previous consultation and, consequently, there 
would	not	be	sufficient	public	appetite	to	provide	input.	
Instead, the Directors of Public Health devised a set of 
guiding principles that would help ‘shortlist’ key priorities 
and both recognised the importance of the need for joint 
working. For Metro it was explained that: “we agreed it 
should be around step change which should not just be 
what individual agencies could do by themselves”  
(Metro, P). 
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3. The role of performance information
There is a very large number of indicators relating 
particularly to health that are available at both national and 
local levels. As noted in the previous section HWBs are 
required to produce a JSNA and in both localities these are 
lengthy reports that are rich with data at both the local 
authority level and at ward level. A wide range of measures 
are reported from information on the wider determinants 
of health outcomes to data on current life expectancy. 
Some of these measures are consistent with national 
initiatives such as the Public Health Outcomes Framework 
whilst others have been developed more locally. Overall 
our interviewees suggest that there is a relatively high level 
of	confidence	that	the	measures	and	indicators	provide	a	
useful reflection of health (and perhaps to a lesser extent 
wellbeing) for the population of a locality. There are, 
however, a very large number of indicators reflecting the 
complexity inherent in understanding the health and 
wellbeing of a locality.
The approaches taken to making use of this extensive 
data set have varied. The JSNA itself is brought to the 
HWB and so members will have an opportunity to see the 
report and underlying data. The JSNA is perceived to be 
an important and helpful tool, but both boards have 
recently looked to develop new ways of reporting 
performance. For City this has taken the form of steps to 
develop JSNA chapters that provide a more detailed, 
in-depth exploration of priority issues. For Metro, in an 
attempt to focus more upon performance in priority areas, 
this has seen the creation of a Performance Scorecard 
aligned	with	the	priorities	identified	in	the	refreshed	
strategy. This is at least in part an acknowledgement of 
the ‘huge’ number of measures and indicators available 
and the inability of the HWBs to consider all of them.
Activities, outputs and outcomes
As	noted	in	the	Introduction,	it	is	particularly	difficult	to	
measure outcomes and this is certainly true in the case  
of health and wellbeing. For instance, health outcomes 
relating to inequalities in life expectancy are complex as 
they may be influenced by very many determinants and 
may take many years to change. As such interviewees 
pointed to the need to measure and monitor activities  
and outputs:
I think the things that you need to measure in Public Health 
is maybe not so much the kind of weight of the children … 
you know, you’re not maybe going to get that but personally 
what I think you want to know is for example how many 
schools are engaging with your campaign? How many 
schools have set up their extra sports clubs for physical 
activity? Or how many are signed up to Healthy Eating and 
…? I think those are better indicators perhaps (City, F)
So I think there are some things that we could do much 
more, there are some outputs, even if you don’t get the 
outcome shifts maybe for three, five, seven, ten, 15 years. 
Actually what are the output shifts or the outputs that 
you’re going to look at that will reflect that you are moving 
in the right direction and more likely therefore to deliver 
those outcomes? (Metro, N)
At Metro there was also a decision that, for the purposes 
of strategic oversight, there was a need for their 
Performance Scorecard to include key measures relating 
to outcomes even where more short-term changes are 
unlikely to be apparent. In addition, however, it was agreed 
that a key criteria for priorities is that “we want to see 
some measurable difference in the next two years” (Metro, 
P). As such, we see that there is a tendency for the HWBs 
to be drawn towards measuring more immediate and 
short-term activities and outputs.
Performance measures and narrative
There was a strong view from both HWBs that it was very 
important for performance measures to be accompanied 
by a narrative.	In	City	the	JSNA	data	profiles	is	
complemented by ‘a lot of narrative’ and the move 
towards presenting Chapters “is all about narrative and 
some data” (City, N). Similarly, the new Performance 
Scorecard at Metro includes a ‘commentary’, which is 
seen as very important in terms of enabling discussion 
and understanding. The ‘commentary’ provides context 
and “can add value and actually help unblock some of the 
issues” (Metro, P). The Metro Scorecard also employs a 
RAG (Red Amber Green) notation against measures and 
so the narrative is recognised as being particularly 
valuable where performance may be “red” and the HWB 
looks for potential reponses. 
Underlying this recognition of the importance of the 
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narrative is an acceptance that the measures themselves 
can be flawed. It appears to be accepted that a greater 
understanding of why reported performance has changed 
or is different to key targets or benchmarks requires 
narrative explanation.    
Looking to the future and putting performance on  
the agenda
Both HWBs recognise a greater role for performance 
information / scorecards as the Boards evolve and mature. 
In particular there is scope for structuring the HWBs’ work 
plans and agenda around themes with associated 
performance information. This is most advanced at Metro 
HWB who now have a performance scorecard in place. A 
concern was raised, however, that the Scorecard may get 
“tagged onto the end of the meeting” (Metro, N) and so is 
given little time and attention. 
In contrast, there was hope that the scorecard could 
become “a very significant core element of the agenda” 
(Metro, O). One suggestion voiced at an observation of 
Metro HWB was that the scorecard be presented at 
meetings with a front sheet identifying issues of concern 
(reds or a worsening in performance). Alternatively it was 
suggested that meetings could be themed around 
priorities where the scorecard is used to provide an insight 
into performance trends. 
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4. Facilitators and Inhibitors
Facilitators
The membership of HWBs includes, as a statutory 
requirement, key players and leaders in health and social 
care within a locality. It is recognised that these members 
are	very	experienced,	hold	significant	influence	on	health	
and wellbeing in the local area, and are responsible for 
very	significant	budgets.	As	an	expert	interviewee	clarified:
…the clinical, political and professional leadership of the 
place in one board. And particularly the strength of having 
the elected member and the GP together as either co-
chairs, or chair and vice-chair, in that role because those 
two have got so much in common in terms of knowing 
that community and the needs of that community. And they 
probably have been there a long time. (Expert, A)
The members of both boards recognised that the HWBs 
have enabled relationships to form, or further develop, 
across the different organisations. Partnership working 
was aided by two further factors at Metro HWB. The 
statutory and non-statutory members referred to a history 
of partnership working prior to the establishment of the 
HWB, with a few members citing continuation of 
partnership working between organisations as an ongoing 
feature. Several of the members offered that, due to the 
location of organisations, it was more straightforward to 
arrange face-to-face meetings. For instance, local 
authority	members,	interim	Healthwatch,	and	fire	and	
police services were within walking distance of each other.
Inhibitors
Members of Metro and City HWB invariably spoke of a lack 
of	time	and	financial	resource	as	inhibiting	the	discharge	
of accountability. On the former, interviewees noted that 
they are leaders, with key organisational responsibilities, in 
their respective organisations and so time to attend formal 
and supplementary meetings was sometimes tight. Policy 
initiatives such as Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships (STPs), and Combined Authorities, served to 
draw attention away from the work of the HWB and were, 
therefore,	deemed	a	distraction.	On	the	latter,	financial	
austerity and, in particular, NHS funding, remained a core 
limitation.	There	was	restricted	sharing	of	financial	
information and no sharing of budgets.
In addition to resource constraints, interviewees revealed 
issues	associated	with	role	fulfilment.	Firstly,	new	
members	at	both	Metro	and	City	recounted	difficulties	in	
becoming familiar with the activities of the Boards, 
especially given limited formal induction, while existing 
members, markedly at City HWB, felt that a turnover in 
board membership was disruptive to partnership working. 
Secondly, non-statutory members, at times, felt 
overwhelmed with the complexity and jargon of the health 
and wellbeing agenda. There is a danger that these 
members lack knowledge and influence within the Board. 
Thirdly, at the time of research, Metro HWB was in the 
process of recommissioning a replacement Healthwatch 
organisation. The original organisation was viewed by 
members as under-performing on their statutory duties 
due to a lack of focus and clarity.
As	a	final	substantive	inhibitor	in	discharging	
accountability, members of the HWBs referred to the need 
to discharge individual organisational responsibilities prior 
to delivering on collective priorities as set out in the JHWS. 
In order to help surmount this issue at City HWB, a series 
of workshops have been initiated to explore ways to 
strengthen health and wellbeing system leadership. 
However, as articulated by an expert respondent, the 
challenge is “creating a health and wellbeing board approach 
where all partners prioritise the need to work together 
collectively. And see that joint work on the areas of health 
and wellbeing as their principle focus rather than the 
success or not of their individual organisation” (Expert, F).
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Table 1: Similarities and differences between Metro and City
Similarities 
Marked differences in life expectancy between the most and least deprived areas
Chair is drawn from the local authority and the Co-Chair is a representative from the CCG
Director of Public Health has a critical role
Irregular attendance by NHS England representative
Members expressed that they felt accountable directly to the local population
Initial construction of strategy uncontroversial
Lack	of	time	and	financial	resources
No sharing of budgets
Differences
Metro City
Lower percentage of children 
living in poverty compared to 
the national average
Higher percentage of children living in low income families 
compared to the national average
Percentage of inhabitants on a 
state pension higher than the 
England average
Percentage of inhabitants on a state pension lower than the 
England average
HWB comprised of statutory and non-statutory members  
(19 members in total)
HWB comprised of statutory members only (16 members in 
total)
HWB chaired by Elected Leader of the Local Authority HWB chaired by the Major of the Local Authority
Recommissioning of Healthwatch organisation No change in Healthwatch organisation
Partnership accountability in evidence
w history of partnership working prior to establishment of HWB
w most HWB members within walking distance of each other
Partnership accountability in emergence
w high turnover of HWB members, including Director of Public Health
w workshops held to strengthen systems leadership
Director of Public Health directly accountable to Chief Executive 
Officer	(first-tier	post)
Director of Public Health directly accountable to a Strategic 
director (second-tier post)
Refresh of strategy involved performing a priority exercise 
against a number of criteria such as achievability within 24 
months
Refresh of strategy involved Board deliberation of a number of 
questions including evidence of need and potential impact
Performance reported in a Performance Scorecard which is 
aligned to priorities, and includes key measures relating to 
outcomes
Performance reported through development of JSNA chapters 
which	focus	on	specific	issues	(for	example,	alcohol	misuse)
An overall summary of the similarities and differences 
between the two cases is provided in Table 1 below:
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The health and wellbeing outcomes for a locality are 
complex and depend on a great number of wider 
determinants and factors. It is recognised, however, that 
improvements in health outcomes and reduced health 
inequalities	have	the	potential	to	provide	significant	
social	and	economic	benefits.	HWBs	have	been	tasked	
with bringing together key leaders from across the 
health and social care systems to help address these 
issues, but being held accountable for such a ‘wicked’ 
problem is, to put it mildly, challenging. 
Accountability regimes in public services (and in 
particular health and social care) are multiple. There is a 
complex web of accountability relationships, which have 
the	potential	to	result	in	accountability	deficits,	overloads	
and tensions. As accountability arrangements change, 
so issues can fall between the cracks or can become 
replicated in more than one arena.	We	find	that	over	time	
our case HWBs have focused on a smaller number of 
priorities where they can work together to make a 
difference. This should reduce the potential for accountability 
overload on issues that are predominantly the concern 
of a single organisation. HWBs provide a new 
accountability forum which may complement existing 
arrangements, but there does continue to be tensions 
between the many different accountability relationships. 
It was originally hoped that HWBs would improve 
democratic accountability, but it appears that there is 
only limited public engagement and very limited threat of 
consequences at the ‘ballot box’. Bovens (2007) and 
Bovens et al. (2008) distinguish the democratic 
accountability perspective from both the constitutional 
and learning perspectives on accountability. Looking 
forward, we suggest that accountability from a learning 
perspective may offer the greatest potential for HWBs. 
As a starting point, the learning perspective requires that 
“information gathering and provision routines yield an 
accurate, timely and clear diagnosis of important 
performance dimensions” (Bovens et al., p. 238). This 
would suggest an important role for the JSNA, Strategy 
and performance scorecards. It would also require 
‘substantial’ debate and discussion of this performance 
both within the HWB and also with broader stakeholders. 
A	challenge	would	be	that	there	is	a	need	for	“sufficiently	
strong outside actors” to hold the HWB to account, but 
at	the	same	time	a	“sufficiently	‘safe’	culture	of	
sanctioning to minimize defensive routines” (Bovens et 
al., 2008, p. 238). 
Finally, we return to the government’s aspirations in 
terms	of	HWBs	leading	to	significant	integrated	working	
across the health and social care systems. We	find	that	
there	are	significant	financial	and	time	constraints	that	
inhibit the potential for greater integration. Our evidence 
suggests that key organisations have tended to “cling on 
to what we have” (City, A) and that there has been very 
little move towards the pooling of budgets or even the 
sharing	of	financial	information.	In	the	future,	it	is	hoped	
that these same organisations “must break out of the 
silos … [and that] everybody’s got to be thinking about 
the big picture” (City, G). Essentially there is a call for 
greater ‘system leadership’, which requires much greater 
integration. In this regard, we note more recent moves 
towards “accountable care systems” for localities and 
suggest that these may provide an appropriate 
framework. We recognise, however, that this will, yet 
again, present a further period of policy uncertainty and 
change which can also be a distraction.
Conclusions
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